Takashi Kunimoto


2005 – Present     Assistant Professor at McGill University

2006 – Present     Research Fellow at CIREQ


May 2005 Ph.D in Economics, Brown University

Dissertation: Essays on Bargaining, Contracts, and Implementation

Principal Advisor: Prof. Roberto Serrano

May 2001 M.A. in Economics, Brown University

March 1999 M.A. in Economics, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan

March 1996 B.E. in Mechanical Engineering, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan

Areas of Interests and Desired Teaching

Bargaining, Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium,

Mechanism Design, Microeconomics

Fellowship, Scholarship, Awards and Grants

2008-2010 Fonds Qu´eb´ecois de la Recherche sur la Soci´et´e et la Culture (FQRSC) Team Grant with

Effrosyni Diamantoudi(Concordia), Licun Xue(McGill), and Szilvia Papai(Concordia)

2006-2010 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Standard Grant

2006-2009 FQRSC Individual Grant

2005-2008 Startup Grant, McGill University

2005-2006 James McGill Professor Fund, McGill University

2002-2004 Research Assistantship, Brown University

2003-2004 The Stephen Robert Dissertation Fellowship

2003 The Abramson and Umezawa-Stoltz award, Brown University

2001-2003 Teaching Assistantship, Brown University

2000-2001 The Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarship, the Rotary Foundation


“Indescribability and Its Irrelevance for Contractual Incompleteness,” forthcoming in Review of Economic Design

“Indescribability and Asymmetric Information at the Contracting Stage,” Economics Letters, vol.99, (2008), 367-370

“Bargaining and Competition Revisited,” (coauthored with Roberto Serrano), Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 115, (2004), 78-88

Working Papers

“Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design,” coauthored with Roberto Serrano, March 2010,

“A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies,” coauthored with Roberto Serrano, January 2010, under revision for Journal of Economic Theory

“Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations,” coauthored with Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, and Olivier Tercieux, May 2010, submitted.

“Implementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection,” coauthored with Olivier Tercieux, July 2009 (the majority of this paper is now incorporated into “Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations”)

“How Robust is Undominated Nash Implementation?” May 2010, under revision for Games and Economic Behavior

“Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Towards a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine,” (coauthored with Georgy Artemov and Roberto Serrano), March 2010, submitted

“Robust Virtual Implementation with Almost Complete Information,” January 2010, under revision for Journal of Mathematical Economics

“On the Non-Robustness of Nash implementation” June 2006

“Robust Implementation under Approximate Common Knowledge” November 2005 (the majority of this paper is now incorporated into “How Robust is Undominated Nash Implementation?”)

Working in Progress

“Refusal-Proof Implementation,” coauthored with Seungjin Han

“An Equivalence of Strategic Topologies between Monderer and Samet (96) and Kajii and Morris (98)”

“On Segal’s (99) Foundation for Incomplete Contracts”