M.A. in Mathematics, M.A. in Economics, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, 2000-2003
Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003-2007
Princeton University: Assistant Professor of Economics, 2007 –
“Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk” (with Gerard Padró i Miquel), forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
“Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games with Exit,” Econometrica 78 (2010), 973-1006.
“Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts,” American Economic Review 100, 448-465.
“Economic Shocks and Civil War” (with Gerard Padró i Miquel), Quarterly Journal of Political Science 4 (2009), 211.
“Defensive Weapons vs. Defensive Alliances,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 2009.
“Non-Asymptotic Tests of Model Performance,” Economic Theory, 2008.
“Uniform Selection in Global Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 139 (2008), 222-241.
“Selective Trials, Information Production and Technology Diffusion” (with Gerard Padró i Miquel and Erik Snowberg), 2009.
“Robustness to Incomplete Information in Repeated Games” (with Satoru Takahashi), forthcoming in Theoretical Economics.