Elchanan Ben-Porath

Elchanan Ben-Porath

Education

B.Sc. 1982 (M.C.L.), TheHebrewUniversity,Jerusalem, Mathematics.

M.Sc. 1985, TheHebrewUniversity,Jerusalem, Mathematics.

Ph.D. 1989, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.

Academic appointments

1989-1991         Assistant Professor, Kellogg Business School, Northwestern University.

1991-1995         Lecturer, Department of Economics, Tel-Aviv University.

1995-2001         Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, Tel-Aviv University.

2001-                Associate Professor, Department of Economics, The Hebrew University.

2003-                Shonbrunn Chair in Mathematical Economics, HU. s

Publications related to this theme

Ben Porath E (1997) “Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games,”  Review of Economic Studies  64, 1997, 23-46.

Ben Porath E (1998) “Correlation Without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibria Outcomes by ‘Cheap’ Pre-Play Procedures,”  Journal of Economic Theory  80, 1998, 108-122.

Ben Porath E Heifetz A. (2007) “Common Knowledge of Rationality and Market Clearing in Economies with Asymmetric Information”, with Aviad Heifetz. Under evision for Journal of Economic Theory. (A previous version entiteld “Rationalizable Expectations” came out as Discussion Paper #461 of the Center for Rationality in August 2007.)

Other publications

“Signaling Future Actions and the Potential for Sacrifice,” with Eddie Dekel,     Journal of Economic Theory  57, 1992, 36-51.

“Repeated Games with Finite Automata,”  Journal of Economic Theory  59, 1993, 17-32.

“Linear Measures, the Gini Index and the Income-Equality Tradeoff”, with Itzhak Gilboa, Journal of Economic Theory   64, 1994, 443-467.

“Communication in Repeated Games with Partial Monitoring,” with Michael Kahneman, Journal of Economic Theory  70, 1996, 281-297.

“Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games,”  Review of Economic Studies  64, 1997, 23-46.

“On the Measurement of Inequality under Uncertainty,” with Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler, Journal of Economic Theory  75, 1997, 194-204.

“Correlation Without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibria Outcomes by ‘Cheap’ Pre-Play Procedures,”  Journal of Economic Theory  80, 1998, 108-122.

“Cheap Talk in Games with Incomplete Information,” Journal of Economic Theory  108, 2003, 45-71.